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Abstract_______________________________________________________________ 
Economic historians explaining the divergent economic path in North and South 
America over time focus on the post-independence period in the former British or 
Spanish colonies. Their institutional explanation for Latin American economic 
backwardness is anchored in the political disorder that occurred in the postcolonial 
period, which did not provide the right conditions for economic growth. Yet, more 
important than political aspects, fiscal and monetary fragmentation of the Spanish 
Empire were major factors in hindering the economic growth later in the 19th century. 
This paper argues that economic struggle over resources determined political outcomes 
rather than the other way round. By assessing the macroeconomic effects of 
Independence on the contemporary and further economic and political development it 
shows that comparisons with North America are ill conceived. The study focuses on the 
disintegration of colonial fiscal and monetary regimes, that had organised the economy 
around silver mining and the export of silver currency as fiscal revenues, and the 
subsequent transformation into export-led economies, specialised in producing raw 
materials and foodstuff. .  
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The usual interpretation of Spanish American Independence is a political one: a crisis of 
legitimacy following the imprisonment of the King and Napoleon’s take-over of Spain in 
1808. These events set off political resistance in Spain and in the colonies. Given the 
incapacity of the new authorities to hold the empire together, the most remote and least 
populated regions of the colonies broke free. Social unrest began in the 1780s, increasing in 
size and extent until the revolution finally ignited in the River Plate in the 1810s. Unlike 
previous revolts in Upper Peru or New Granada, this time a revolutionary movement 
emerged from within the Spanish and Creole elite and soon spread to the neighbouring 
areas. Meanwhile, in northern parts of the empire, a rebellion of non-elites was also taking 
off. Emancipation was complete in 1825, when the last Spanish post fell in Upper Peru, 
present day Bolivia. In the same year Britain recognised the diplomatic status of the new 
republics and signed commercial treaties with most of them. Distance from the metropolis 
and the costs of suppressing the rebellion can explain why the poorest colonies left first. 
Instead Spain reaction focused on the explosive political and social reactions occurring in 
the wealthier and less peripheral regions of the empire, such as Mexico and Peru. Reasons 
for resistance were various but similar. The Bourbon reforms of the 1760s-1780s had led to 
major redistribution of wealth and importance within the empire. They also altered the tax 
burden across the empire and between classes within the colonies. The costly involvement 
of Spain in European wars accelerated and distorted these disparities further.  
Neo-institutional interpretations of Independence depict a region absorbed by political 
divisions, endemic civil wars, despotic rule and disorder, which together wasted the growth 
potential of these economies. Political historians emphasise the territorial fragmentation, 
the long civil warfare that prevailed after the end of Spanish rule and the resulting political 
instability as a corollary of Independence. In fact, explanations for Latin America’s 
economic performance in the nineteenth century owe greatly to these political accounts of 
the revolution. Independence is seen as exogenous to the economic analysis following the 
birth of the modern republics. It is not surprising that institutional explanations are the 
most developed and commonly used to address the stagnation of Latin America 
economies. However, there are no explorations of probable economic causes for the long 
civil warfare, disorder and weak institutionality, that preceded Independence in Latin 
America. The eventual political constitution that succeeded the present day republics has 
been taken for granted. Two obvious questions arise from this framework, but the 
literature has barely considered: What was the warfare or the political strife about? Were 
the national boundaries of these countries in the 1860s-80s predetermined?  
This essay will address these questions by inverting the terms for reasoning: it will show 
how macroeconomic aspects are crucial to an understanding of the political and economic 
outcomes of the Spanish American Independence. The approach differs from Acemoglu, 
Johnson & Robinson (2002). These authors revise the causal effects of macroeconomic 
policies on economic outcomes and find that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic 
policies have weak institutions. They suggest that distortionary macroeconomic policies are 
more likely to be the effects of underlying institutional problems rather than main causes of 
economic volatility.1 Yet how did these economic aspects, namely fiscal and monetary 
events, affect the extent, duration, and contents of civil war, and thus political instability? 
Ultimately there were political-economic path dependencies in the design of the Latin 
American political map of the nineteenth century, as well as in the subsequent 
transformation of some economies into raw material and foodstuff exporters and in the 
                                                           
1 See also (Fishlow 1990) on the virtues of and reasons for an effective macroeconomic policy in Latin 
America in the 1990s. In a review of a recent collection of essays by D. Rodrik, the importance of 
macroeconomic stability to foster economic growth was highlighted. LR Pomfet, (2003). “What emerges 
surprisingly clearly is the importance of macroeconomic stability” 
decline of the mining economies. This interaction affected resource allocation given factor 
endowments and relative transport costs, and thus shaped the path of development of 
these economies thereafter.  
Hence, a path dependence analysis of the macroeconomic effects of the intertemporal 
budget constraint in the transition from colonies to independent nations seems more 
accurate thn the NIE for explaining the dynamics of the growth process. This research 
follows a dynamic approach based on the `transversality condition´ (the time consistency 
problem between fiscal policy and fiscal policy as the handmaiden of monetary policy) 
derived from Sargent & Wallace, (1981), Sargent (1987, 1997, 1999), Sargent & Ljungqvist 
(2000), Alesina y Perotti, (1995), Barro (1997a & 1997b).2 By studying the intertemporal 
budget constraint, the fiscal and monetary dilemma can be modelled: How to fund any set 
of institutions and rules of the game, economic and political, irrespective of the 
government’s utility function? Any governing body (of any scale or scope, irrespective of 
its success at effectively controlling a territorial jurisdiction) faces a dilemma when it seeks 
the means to finance its rule over time (further taxes, borrowing, seigniorage or inflationary 
tax), but is limited by the existing fiscal and financial position. So causality goes in both 
directions. Based on this approach this paper seeks to disentangle: a) changes in relative 
prices (distribution of income); b) the real effects on exchanges rates (terms of trade); and 
c) the influence on the economic decision making of individuals (incentives). These 
elements are crucial to assess the scope of capital markets, the integration of markets, and 
the benefits (or losses) expected from trade. This essay is a forward looking assessment of 
the macroeconomic results of fiscal and monetary arrangements in the former Spanish 
American colonies. 
The paper is divided in five sections. The first comprehensively reviews the available 
literature in order to set the argument in context. The second presents a consideration of 
the alleged political instability as the roots of the Latin American economic failure. Section 
three focuses on the macroeconomic aspects of the Independence, with particular 
emphasis on fiscal and monetary issues. The fourth section assesses some economic 
consequences of the fiscal fragmentation and the resulting diversity of monies that 
occurred along with the political disintegration of the Empire. It addresses how the regions 
performed during the age of globalisation, and explores what benefits these countries could 
have gained from the expansion of international trade and financial markets that occurred 
in the late nineteenth century. Finally some conclusions are offered. 
 
I. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The revolution reduced the Spanish empire to a contentious jigsaw puzzle, one that took 
more than fifty years to finally constitute individual markets and polities. During this period 
the new republics spent their resources on efforts to establish a new order and legitimacy, 
which would enable them to claim future fiscal revenues. These revenues would be the 
bases of the modern states. Traditional economic historians argue that it was only with the 
definitive constitution of these new countries that their economic potential could be 
realised. Institutional stability fostered the inflow of foreign capital. Capital markets took 
shape as a means to fund the now stable rulers. Exports boomed in some economies, 
allowing them to enjoy the fruits of globalisation in the last quarter of the century. Some of 
these new republics outperformed the rich economies of the Old World, even becoming 
standards of success at the time. However, as shown more recently,  the previous 50 years 
at the beginning of the century were crucial for the subsequent performance of the Latin 
                                                           
2 For a similar study see Della Paolera, Irigoin & Bozzoli (2003) 
American economies in the long run (Coatsworth 1998, Haber 1997, Cardenas 1997), and 
it is clear that Latin America fell behind very early after Independence if the USA is used as 
the standard of comparison.  
Macroeconomic aspects of the revolutionary process clearly mattered, as shown in a 
number of extremely valuable analyses of the French and North American Revolutions 
(Sargent and Velde, 1995 and Bordo and Vegh 1998). But no comparable study has been 
undertaken for Latin America. Instead, there are two related features in studies of Latin 
America’s post-colonial economies: a)  the comparison with those areas of North America  
colonised by the British and the French as a standard of economic and institutional 
development (North, Weingast and Summerhill, 2000, Coatsworth 1998, Coatsworth and 
Tortella, 2001, Sokoloff 2001, Coatsworth and Williamson 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 
1997, 2000, 2003 for a different view); and b) the assessment of the economic performance 
of the independent republics by using macroeconomic aggregates (Coatsworth 1998). Yet 
these parameters have some statistical weakness and problems of significance. The required 
information at aggregate level is only available (or robust enough) after the 1880s at best. 
Only by then had nation-scale administrations been fully established without disputes. 
Indeed, the strife about the form (fiscal and political form, or constitution) had ended. As 
will be developed below, this is a sensitive claim for the argument presented in this paper. 
In addition, this approach has some ontological flaws:  
1) The macroeconomic aggregates by the 1880s are themselves the results of 
economic and political processes in the former colonial regions, which ended with 
the creation of nation-scale markets. The indispensability of the political and 
economic outcomes should be considered when using ex-post and reduced forms 
of data.  
2) As said, most often independence has been taken as an exogenous factor in the 
explanation of its economic consequences. Some general features have been 
attributed to the end of Spanish rule without considering that the prime result of 
independence was the disintegration of the colonial state. It resulted not only 
in the political fragmentation of the empire, but also in the collapse of the fiscal 
system and monetary regime that had organised the economy in the continent for 
three centuries. Independence in Spanish America also meant the 
disintegration of the largest fiscal and monetary union ever known to that 
date.  
3) Since neither the economic orientation of the new republics nor their taxation 
differed much in postcolonial times compared to the colonial  fiscal structure, it 
does not seem appropriate to consider the change of political system as a breaking 
point or a discontinuity in the economic history of Spanish America. Regardless of 
some idiosyncratic events3, any economic interpretation of Spanish American 
Independence should account for the particulars of the fiscal and financial 
situation, in the empire and its respective colonies, by the 1800s.4  
                                                           
3 For instance the failure of the Insurgence rebellion in Mexico in 1810 followed by the restoration of Spanish 
rule for a decade; or the quiet resignation of the governor in Panama, to take oath as head of the 
revolutionary government the same afternoon. 
4 The historiography of the fiscal and administrative reforms directed by the Carlos III and his heirs is wide 
but inconclusive on their long run impact. Few scholars have suggested a link between the fiscal crisis of the 
Ancien Regime in Spain and the collapse of Imperial rule (Fontana, 1971). However no further research has 
explored this assumption, nor has it related them to the economic stagnation of both the metropolis and the 
empire during the nineteenth century. 
With the exception of a few compilations of articles, (Prados & Amaral, 1993, Liehr, 1989), 
independence from Spain has not received much attention from economic historians other 
than from the North American scholars mentioned above. In fact, available interpretations 
of the performance of Latin American economies in the nineteenth century are focused on 
the economic consequences of political events - rather than the economic causes of 
institutional changes -, namely the effects of mercantilist rule’s disappearance. However the 
integration of national economies in the Atlantic world was only realised once the modern 
states consolidated by the end of the nineteenth century.  
The view of Latin American and European historians is definitively shaped by the idea that 
Independence was an exogenous political phenomenon, and this permeates the literature of 
every aspects of Latin American studies. The revolutionary decades are considered a 
watershed in the long transition from colonies to individual nations and markets. This is 
even apparent in major studies on economic, fiscal and monetary history of the continent, 
as seen in the seminal work by TePaske and Klein. Comparably good studies are available 
on the financial and fiscal situation of each of the new republics.5 The former analyse the 
empire in South America as a whole entity, desegregated by viceroyalties as the largest 
political and administrative units in the New World, the latter have focused on the 
individual republics, although these only defined their political and fiscal boundaries by the 
1860s. One and another use the revolutionary decades, respectively in each viceroyalty, to 
set either the starting point or the closing date for their analysis. Setting the stage for 
studying the economic and institutional performances of the former colonies around a 
political discontinuity in the 1810s-20s disregards major continuities, like taxation and 
monetary regime, that persisted in the new republics. In fact, as will be shown, the legacy of 
these partial or incomplete institutional changes affected the economic success of the 
postcolonial states. 
The economic history of individual countries in the nineteenth century is overwhelmingly 
organised around political and institutional events. For instance it is common to mistake 
the history of the province of Buenos Aires for that of Argentina. Yet before the 1860s 
there was no such identifiable jurisdiction either politically or fiscally. Nor did the region by 
the 1870s yet have a national currency. In the late 1870s debased Bolivian coins formed the 
reserves of Argentina’s incipient banking system, and in some areas of the Argentinean 
Interior Chilean paper money was preferred to that issued by several provinces.6 The 
Viceroyalty of New Granada also achieved independence from Spain in the 1810s, under 
the name of Great Colombia. It took 20 years to break into three different fiscal and 
monetary entities, as modern Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia, from which Panama 
separated only in 1903. The River Plate viceroyalty established in 1776 also broke up. 
Paraguay separated in 1811. Chile separated in 1818 after the revolutionary armies took 
over the capital. Uruguay, on the eastern bank of the River Plate finally and formally broke 
away in 1825, following the war between Brazil and the United Provinces of the River 
Plate. Potosi and the adjacent regions also formed a new republic in 1825 after fifteen years 
of continuous warfare with royalists. Yet Bolivia had a very unstable political life after 
independence, and into the 1830s and 1840s it was involved in fights with Peru. For part of 
the 1840s both countries shared Customs in the port of Arica, once Bolivia’s attempt for 
open access to the Pacific was defeated by its own fiscal and monetary decline.  
Mexico is probably the most obvious example of the inconvenience of using 1880s’ nations 
as the unit of analysis to assess the fate of Latin American republics in the post 
                                                           
5 A recent collection of essays provides a good overview of the fiscal and monetary history of individual 
countries. Bordo and Cortes Conde (2001) in particular ch 9-12.  
6 In fact contemporary diplomats and international bankers considered the provinces to be separate units. In 
the River Plate area a loose confederation of provinces existed until the 1860s, entangled in civil warfare. 
independence period. From 1836 to 1848 Mexico lost 55,000 kms2, more than half of the 
territory which New Spain had in colonial times. The loss of today’s Texas, New Mexico, 
Florida and California means that Mexico is ill suited for comparisons of economic 
performance with other national economies that incorporated larger territories in the same 
period. More important, however, are the fiscal and financial costs that the territorial loss 
caused. The financial and monetary strain Mexico endured to maintain its territorial 
jurisdiction together had a definitive macroeconomic impact, as will be shown. Thus in the 
20 to 30 years following the end of Spanish rule, Mexico incurred huge extra costs while 
the macroeconomic fundamentals of the empire continued to decline. The succeeding 
fiscal, financial and political constitution of the new republic was resolved in these decades. 
This process was expensive and determined the ensuing development of the postcolonial 
economies.  
Indeed political boundaries emerged from within the existing colonial fiscal structure. So 
the definitive constitution of the republics later in the century resulted from the aggregation 
of some of these fiscal and monetary entities into new states. The revolution meant that 
cabildos (colonial corporation for local government) resumed sovereignty over the realm 
once the king was imprisoned in 1808. For political historians the resumption of 
sovereignty was the constitutional issue at stake in the process that opened with 
Independence. New local governments, juntas, were formed at every village or city of some 
importance, as occurred in the peninsula. Significantly, these locations were the sites of the 
cajas reales, local royal treasuries. Before the Revolution these treasury districts were an 
integral part of the imperial fiscal network to organise royal finances. Their officials 
supervised the collection and distribution of royal revenues. They also defrayed the current 
expenses of the administration and regular military. These cajas were located in vice regal 
capitals, productive mining areas, major ports, agricultural-market centres, administrative 
cities and military outposts. As the empire extended and the Bourbons policies reinforced 
the extraction of fiscal rents, new cajas appeared all over the Indies as a means of 
reinforcing royal control over the collection of taxes and thus insuring the crown its share 
of that income. By the 1810s Mexico had 23 fiscal districts, New Granada had 18, Peru had 
13, Chile had 5, the River Plate had 14, and the Upper Peru had 9.7 
The near equivalence of the sites of the former fiscal administration and the ensuing 
political units that emerged after the Revolution is very telling. Those units, provinces or 
states became to a great extent fiscally and politically autonomous. Some of them were 
bound to each other in loosely defined constitutional (federal, confederate or consolidated) 
national states. More often though, they were related to each other by the continuous 
warfare that characterised nineteenth century Latin American political development. As will 
be shown, most of them also attempted to have their own money. Indeed the economic 
and political process of their successive aggregation into greater fiscal units should sketch 
the economic history of state formation of Latin America’s current republics in the 19th 
Century. 
                                                           
7 The cajas were located as follows: for New Spain (Mexico) in Acapulco, Arispe, Bolaños, Campeche, 
Chihuahua, Durango, Guadalajara, Guanajuato, Merida, Mexico, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Pachuca, Presidio de 
Carmen, Puebla, Los Alamos -Rosario, Saltillo, San Luis Potosi, Sombrerete, Tabasco, Veracruz, Zacatecas 
and Zimapan. For Peru in Arequipa, Carabaya, Castrovirreyna, Chachapoyas, Cuzco, Huamanga, 
Huancavelica, Jauja, Lima, Piura y Paita, Puno, Saña, San Juan de Matucana, Trujillo, Vico and Pasco. For the 
Upper Peru (Bolivia) in Carangas, Charcas, Chucuito, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra and Arica, For Chile  in Concepcion, Mendoza, Santiago, Valdivia and Chiloe. In The River Plate: 
Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Cordoba del Tucuman, Corrientes, Jujuy, La Rioja, Maldonado, Montevideo, 
Paraguay, Salta, San Juan, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero and Tucuman. TePaske (1984) p.70. Cuba had 23 (Te 
Paske, 2002, 32). In New Granada the main 4 cajas, Cartagena, Bogota, Popayan, Panama gathered 67% of 
total royal revenues. Jaramillo, Meisel & Urrutia (2001) 
II. Instability. What instability? 
According to North, Weingast and Summerhill, "The Spanish Crown had long provided an 
important enforcement mechanism".8 Without it political disorder followed. Disorder 
engendered political instability and this caused uncertainty and raised transaction costs, all 
of which acted as a deterrent to growth. But does causality run from political to economic 
events? What is instability? What were the ultimate roots of Latin America’s political 
instability?  
Nineteenth century Mexican political history is probably the paradigm of political strife and 
instability. Data shown in table 1 confirms the stereotype.  
 
Table 1. Measuring Instability. Members of Mexican Administrations´ length of term, 1824-1857.  
(in months) 
 
Position Number Mean months Max months 
President 16 12.81 54 
Minister of War 53 6.32 30 
Minister of Finance 87 4.31 32 
Foreign minister  57 4.98 32 
Minister of Justice 61 6.13 29 
Provisional governments    
President 33 5.97 32 
Provisional War 24 2.12 21 
Provisional Finance 32 0.75 3 
Provisional foreign 28 3.07 20 
Provisional justice 33 1.24 14 
Total 424 4.65 54 
Own estimates from DF Stevens Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico (1991) 
 
The job of the person in charge of Mexican finances (only the national or federal 
administration are shown above) was far more hectic than that of those responsible for the 
armies or the polity. The longest term of the state secretary in charge of the Mexican 
Treasury was 32 months in the early 1830s. Even during the more stable years of Benito 
Juarez (1861-1872) there were 8 changes in the person who conducted Mexican finances.9 
As will be further developed below, revolutionary governments led by the Great Liberators 
of Latin America all failed in administering the new republics’ finances: Generals such as 
Santander in Colombia, Sucre in Bolivia or San Martin in Peru, who surrender the 
government to a Constituent Congress in 1822. At the same time that the amortization of 
paper money his government had issued. Patriot troops rioted in Lima as they were 
favoured recipients of paper money. “Public order disintegrated” concurrent to the failure 
of paper money. Both were due admittedly to “the revolution’s inability to become 
financially self-sufficient”. (Anna, 1974, 878) 10 
                                                           
8 ".. widespread political instability and violence distinguish much of Latin America. While the US enjoyed an 
enduring set of political arrangements that both provided to stability and protected markets from predation, 
most of Spanish America erupted in internecine war. Instability diverted resources from economic activity 
and channelled them into caudillo armies and a variety of praetorian efforts. Instability made impossible to 
establish institutions that could bring the expected private returns rate from investment closer in line with 
social returns" North, Weingast & Summerhill (2000) p. 41ss. 
9 During the porfiriato (1877-1911) there were 16 secretaries L. Ludlow (cord) Los Secretarios de Hacienda y sus 
proyectos (Mexico, 2002)  I, 26-7, 170.2, 312-3; II, 9, 86.  
10 For a quite different trajectory in the case of the French Revolution, see Sargent & Velde (1995) 
“Many of the people who had most warmly welcomed the hero of Ayacucho [General 
Sucre] in 1825 became his most convinced enemies during the next three years”. Mutinies 
broke in Chuquisaca, one of the most tortured regions of present day Bolivia. This was 
where the tax revolt had started in the late 1780s and had also been the battlefield in the 
long war between Spaniards and patriots. As explained below, Sucre’s endeavours to 
reform colonial taxation according to Simon Bolivar’s plans failed entirely. He wrote to 
Bolivar in his resignation from the Presidency of Bolivia “I am convinced that in the long 
run [Bolivia] will become inflamed like the rest of America, and I do not want to be the 
victim, when knowing the causes, I see that the solution is impossible”.11 
The case of Peru is probably the most ominous example of the fiscal nature of the ensuing 
political instability that eroded the achievements of the Founding Fathers. Lima was 
surrendered to revolutionary armies after an agonising 3 years, during which Spaniards 
resisted a long naval siege to Callao while fighting back in the mining areas inland. Fiscal 
needs had already obliged Spanish officials to abandon mercantilist restrictions and adopt 
free trade in the most recalcitrant loyalist colony of the empire. Spanish rule in Peru already 
financially depended on customs revenues, from which it obtained more than 30% of its 
income. (Jacobsen 1989, 318). This anticipated the later course of action of post-
independent republics. Fifteen years of war in the region had exhausted the royal treasury 
and the purses of Peruvians. The situation became dramatic as Lima’s food supplies ran 
short. Over-taxation and compulsory borrowing by royalists had ruined the mercantile 
classes and depleted the local capital stock. Unable to raise money from locals, 
revolutionary leaders abolished all direct taxes as a desperate means to gather popularity.12 
Were political causes ultimately behind the overall disorder, within this framework of fiscal 
and financial penury? What was the scope revolutionary governments had to set a stable 
macroeconomic environment that could accompany the change of political regime? What 
was the legacy that they received from colonial rulers, and what could they bequeath to 
following republican administrations? All these republics achieved their independence by 
1825. Together with their new diplomatic status came their bonds to foreign sources of 
capital. However, all these countries defaulted on the loans that were contracted during the 
London market’s boom in 1824. (Marichal 1989) The crash of the London market was 
caused by “the anticipatory export of goods to South America by British merchants 
counting on payment eventually from the great loans that were made in 1824. [But] the 
Latin American venture proved to be little more than empty mine shafts” (Neal, 1993 p. 
172). In Latin America this episode disturbed further trade as markets were glutted and 
specie was severely drained. Increasing shortages of circulating specie were also due to an 
increased demand for money as recruitment and mobilisation monetised sectors formerly 
outside the wage economy, e.g. slaves and indigenous communities. There were also 
increasing needs for domestic borrowing as budgets fell short of military expenditures. 
With debt default, external sources of capital dried up. Thus further taxes, domestic 
borrowing, or monetary experiments were the only avenues out of the fiscal and financial 
strangling left by the crisis of the empire in the continent.  
By the first decade of the nineteenth century, Spanish American societies were fiscally 
exhausted from the strain of Bourbon demands for revenues. John J TePaske, one of the 
                                                           
11 Quoted in Lofstrom  (1970). p. 298. 
12 They also recognised debts they had incurred on (6.50 million), distinguishing from $11.7 million of the 
colonial standing debt (Anna, 1974, 678). The financial burden imposed on late colonial administrations by 
the metropolis demands to maintain Spain at war is suggested by Marichal, (1999). From 1781 to 1811, 
colonial subjects in New Spain had assisted the crown with more than 44 million pesos in all types of 
voluntary or compulsory loans. The sum represented 5% of the total revenue of Spain in the period. (Ibid. 
Appx I-3). Mexican silver had also guaranteed the Spanish borrowing of 58 million Dutch guilders in Holland 
between 1779 and 1807.  
most knowledgeable scholars of Spanish American finance, points out that the financial 
depletion and exhaustion of the colonial economy combined with the enormous exaction 
of revenues paved the way for the revolt, and eventually the collapse of the empire.13 As 
said, this situation had left Peru at the time of the Revolution in a uniquely acute fiscal and 
financial disarray. While eighty per cent of Peruvian exports in the 1790s consisted of  
millions of silver coins and bars, by 1821 this same economy had to resort to fiat paper 
money to pay for current expenses. Issues amounted to $500,000, half of the average yearly 
customs revenues, and lasted in circulation no longer than 2 years. The failure of 
revolutionaries at achieving some sort of financial stability was repeated in the River Plate 
and in Mexico. In the River Plate, General Pueyrredon started to issue paper scrip for 
paying current expenses as early as 1817. In 1823 the Empire of General Iturbide, who led 
the expulsion of royalists from Mexico, saw his fiduciary experiment collapse within 
months, and the 4 million paper pesos he had printed rapidly disappeared from 
circulation.14 In the year following the resignation of General Sucre, Bolivia started playing 
around with the silver quality of its currency.  
The fiscal and financial crisis of the Empire was crudely apparent to the revolutionaries. 
They needed revenues in order to establish republican rule. These revenues had been the 
pillars of the empire, as shown in the well-regarded "pillar" Spanish dollars. Adam Smith 
had already noted that, opposite to what had been the experience of British colonies, 
Spanish Americans had funded the existence and expansion of the empire.15 Now, in the 
absence of the Spanish king, who would furnish the state in the role of revenue collector? 
Who ultimately would "pay" for the costs arising from the new state of affairs? This 
demanded a consensus that, in a society as fragmented s postcolonial Hispanic American, 
was far from easy to achieve. Clearly, the initial setting for post-independent rulers 
appeared to be seriously conditioned by the existing fiscal and financial bankruptcy of the 
colonial Treasury and economy. 
 
                                                           
13 Te Paske (1982) 
14 During the Iturbide Empire of 1821-22 four million pesos were issued as fiduciary money, but they were 
soon retired from circulation in 1823.  This was despite their being printed on the reverse of papal edicts for 
persuasion. (Lopez Rosado 1975. 41). 
15 In those institutional accounts of the relative backwardness of Latin American republics the lack of self 
government is associated with inefficiencies from its colonial legacy in instituting governing institutions 
conducive to growth, as was the case in North America. (North, Weingast and Summerhill, 2000). The 
assumption of a highly centralised absolutist state, attributed to Spain, (North & Weingast, 1989, North, 
1989) is a misjudgement of the political nature of the imperial system of governance as shown by Jack 
Green’s idea of negotiated empires and John Elliot’s definition of early modern Europe as a system of composite 
monarchies. Jack Green draws in contemporaries like Edmund Burke, Charles Davenant, Adam Smith, and 
others to depict how the English Empire was changing at the time of the American Revolution: ".. the 
intensifying rivalries with France and Spain led to .. systematic constitutional discussions about the nature and 
workings of the empire. .. for the implementation of an imperial system that, like the contemporary Bourbon 
reforms in the Spanish Empire, would be uniformly structured, depoliticized and subject to rational directions 
[where] a new directive mode of imperial governance [would be substituted for] the traditional consensual 
[mode of governance]. The aftermath of the Seven Years War provided an occasion for a "policy revolution" 
that "involved direct metropolitan taxation of the colonies to help pay debts accumulated during the war" 
.."this [offensive] was complicated by changes in the internal governance of Great Britain following the 
Glorious Revolution .. [change of a dominium regale for the dominium politicum et regale in which the ruler needed 
consent and that consent usually had to be given by the representative assembly .. [furthermore] the American 
withdrawal from the British empire neither settled this controversy over the nature of the empire, nor put and 
end to British efforts to enhance metropolitan authority over the colonies" (Greene, 2002. P.276-79). The 
present performance of most of the colonies that remained within the British Empire until the mid 20th 
century shows that the case of the 13 North American colonies that left in 1776 was an extraordinary case 
rather than the standard legacy of British American institutions. Thus it considers the US as the norm in the 
assessment of the role of institutions in intensive growth economies.   
III.a. FISCAL FRAGMENTATION 
Originally the colonial fiscal structure was highly decentralised. The collection of revenues 
and the distribution of funds for current expenses was allocated through the 48 cajas reales.  
(Klein & TePaske 1982, TePaske 1982, 1986, Klein 1995) These were the purses of the 
empire. Historians have shown the importance of these cajas in financing the empire in the 
Caribbean, Florida and Cuba, the Philippines and in Cartagena de Indias with the situados 
(transfers) from New Spain (Marichal & Souto 1994) and New Granada (Meisel 2000), just 
as the River Plate was subsidised by Upper Peru (Halperin, 1980). The collection and 
distribution of revenues at the regional level had developed along with a high degree of 
autonomy and integration in the regional economies.  
This system of financing the colonial state was created by the Bourbons to distribute the 
surpluses to the less favoured parts of the empire. Silver shipped from New Spain to the 
Caribbean funded the Spanish intervention in the imperial wars of the 1780s. Via Cuba, 
funds were redistributed to Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Florida, and Louisiana. Silver 
thus spilled over into the English possessions in the Caribbean islands. Seventy-five 
percent of the Treasury in Cuba consisted of situado from New Spain, which during the war 
with England in 1779-1783 amounted to at least 37 million pesos.16 These subsidies became 
increasingly important in Buenos Aires after 1776, when the Bourbon reforms placed the 
mines of Potosi (separated from Lima) under the control of colonial authorities recently 
established in the River Plate. In colonial times Potosi was the chief treasury in terms of 
yield, and it distributed revenues throughout the southern part of the empire. In fact the 
situado financed the colonial capital with a subsidy of up to 1.5 million pesos a year.17 These 
sums represented 54% of the Potosi treasury’s total yield and one third of the Buenos Aires 
treasury’s total income, which was the main caja in the River Plate.18 This subsidy continued 
until the outbreak of Revolution in the 1810s. In a review of recent works on Mexican 
economic history Richard Salvucci use the example of Cuba to show that these fund 
transfers within the empire financed colonies deprived of silver. The same point could  be 
made of Buenos Aires. As Salvucci suggests, the role that these intra-imperial subsidies had 
in attracting trade has to be considered when comparing the economic performance of the 
different former colonies.19  
By 1810 the fiscal structure in Spanish America was heavily strained under the burden of 
metropolitan demands. Since the 1780s the economy had been suffering from mounting 
fiscal pressures and a growing social resistance that these policies provoked. Local 
authorities established at the sites of the cajas could grab revenues formerly collected for the 
imperial treasury. Thus they had an easy means to fund their participation in the 
disintegration of the Imperial state, particularly in the collapse of its fiscal and monetary 
institutions and the vacuum of a legitimate authority. With increasing demands to arm 
revolutionary troops and as domestic sources of revenues shrunk, each province collected 
levies on the goods that were consumed or in transit through its jurisdiction. In the 
subsequent attempts to form some sort of consolidated state on a greater scale, strife about 
revenue collection usually turned into open warfare.  
Some colonies had a calmer transition to a republican fiscal and political constitution than 
others, notably Chile. Most of the others though remained entangled in political disorder 
and institutional instability. After 1821 Mexico, for instance, formally alternated between a 
centralist consolidated state and a federalist reunion of autonomous states (provinces), 
                                                           
16 Marichal, (1999. P.50-1) 
17 TePaske  (1982) appendix viii. p. 94 
18 Klein, (1973) Table 1.   
19 As done by Coatsworth,(1998). He found that both Cuba and Argentina (Buenos Aires) were the most 
successful of the post-independent economies. Salvucci (2001) 
most of which were former sites of a caja and operated their own mint houses. The 
centralist-federalist dispute conceals the competition between Mexico City merchants 
connected to the monopolistic trade via Veracruz with the economic interests of new local 
and regional competitors. As will be shown, after 1824 Mexico had more than 10 mint 
houses instead of a single one in Mexico City. Some of them were very near to rich mining 
centers, and were close to and well-integrated with the three new ports opened in the 
Pacific (San Blas, Acapulco and Mazatlan), or the two new Ports in the Atlantic (Tampico, 
Campeche). Ultimately this resulted in increased political bargaining over the benefits (or 
revenues) of being able to trade silver for imported consumer goods. Thus Mexico’s 
transition to undisputed republican institutions, which would reduce transactions costs and 
promote some growth, was costlier and longer than Chile’s. It took Mexico about 80 years 
after the Insurgencia revolted against Spain in 1811 to reach a period of institutional 
modernisation and some economic growth, under the regime known as Porfiriato. 
Extracting blood from a turnip: postcolonial taxation  
In 1840 an Englishman travelling in Mexico wondered  
"How much taxation people can bear? Mexicans achieved the miracle almost as 
great as extracting blood from a turnip. There is no country in the world, which for 
its surpassed climate, variety of land, production, which in proportion of its 
population is capable of producing so much, certainly none which does produce so 
little." 20 
As noted by Adam Smith, the base and success of the Spanish colonial taxation system was 
the export of net fiscal rents and the income derived from silver mining.21 Yet with the 
disappearance of Spanish power these fiscal rents should have become available to 
revolutionary governments, as the tax scheme did not change much with the Revolution. 
Early in the century Liberal reformers tried to lower the heavy tax burden inherited from 
the Bourbon reforms by decreasing or abolishing all of the main forms of colonial taxation 
(e.g. Indian tributes, taxes on mining and monopolies, customs and sales taxes), but they 
failed utterly. A clear pattern became apparent in all of these cases very early on: Where the 
yield of any individual tax had been significant to the colonial treasury, no changes to the 
tax scheme were introduced after Independence. 
The abolition of the Indian tribute, for example, was an aim eagerly pursued by liberal 
administrations. Nevertheless tribute (head taxes) continued to be a substantial part of the 
new Mexican states’ treasury. Similarly in Bolivia, the Indian tribute was still the main 
source of revenues (40%) in the post-independence period, and throughout the century. 
Colombia only abolished it in 1850 (Deas, 1981), and in republican Peru it made up a third 
of total revenues during the stormy 20 years after the withdrawal of Spanish forces. Such a 
large share of ordinary income was very difficult to abolish, particularly considering the lack 
of alternative sources of revenues. The share of tribute in revenues remained substantial in 
highly populated areas, just as rents from the monopoly on tobacco, salt or gunpowder 
persisted longer where yields had been important under Spanish rule, as in Colombia or 
Paraguay.  
                                                           
20 He also observed that the "Population of Massachusetts was almost a tenth as great of Mexico and its 
productions vary nearly in an inverse ratio with the number of their respective population, if excluding mines 
there is a greater disproportion." (Thompson, 1846) p. 192. He was also bewildered by the tripling of annual 
expenditure in the post-viceregal period and wondered - advancing a puzzle to the NIE - "can it be true 
that costs more to exercise laws made by the people themselves than the edicts of a despot?". P.197. 
emphasis added. 
21 From 1800 the colonies in America contributed half or more of the Spanish Imperial Treasury’s ordinary 
income. (Marichal 1999. 36) 
Revolutionary governments seeking to foster their recovery were also keen to relieve the 
fiscal burden on mining. Hence, taxes on silver were abolished or reduced. However the 
metropolis had previously subsidised crucial inputs. Imports of quicksilver by republican 
governments were severely contingent on their fiscal position, which contributed to the 
stagnation of silver mining across all the mining regions in Latin America.  
Historians explain the decline of silver mining with a number of reasons: technological 
backwardness, exhaustion of ores and the destruction of physical and human capital during 
the wars of Independence, etc. Others recall the sudden lack of capital after the flight of 
wealthy Spaniards following expropriations after the revolution (Quiroz, 1993, 131). To 
some extent this was probably the case in Peru and Mexico. But even if there was a capital 
shortage, it was short lived. Direct foreign capital was invested in South American mines 
soon after Independence.22 From the mid-1820s English funds eagerly poured into mining. 
Later in the 1840s US merchants formed companies, which practically controlled the 
process of smelting and minting in the regional mint houses in Mexico.  
Yet locals rarely invested sizeable stocks of capital in mining in the post independence 
period. Studies on Bolivian economic history have estimated severe outflows of capital in 
the century. (Klein, 1993,p. 87)  Hence, and despite short lived booms such as in 1840s 
Peru (Pasco), only Chile’s silver and gold mines fared better under the new regimes. In fact, 
the rich ores there were only discovered after independence, and this particular 
development of Chilean mining rendered sizeable revenues. Chile’s sources of revenues 
were comparatively more distributed. Its dependence on customs was necessarily lower, 
and the fiscal burden on consumers was lighter. Chile had a much more stable 
macroeconomic situation than its neighbours in the early nineteenth century, as well as a 
more stable currency over the century. Not surprisingly, the Chilean political transition in 
the post independence period was far smoother than its neighbours.  
Bolivia was probably a rare case where local money was invested to some extent in mining 
by mid century. By then the riches of colonial Potosi were barely a memory of the past. 
(Mitre 1986) Contemporaries who had knowledge and long investment experience in 
mining were still limited by a lack of credit, which may explain mining’s gloomy 
performance. 23  This is an explanation worth exploring further. It is likely that the 
detrimental effects of macroeconomic instability and inflation affected the availability of 
credit in the local economy, as it affected the prospect of foreign direct investment. Thus 
loanable capital must have been either very scarce or more expensive than otherwise. This 
can account for the observed low investment ratio. Wealthy locals preferred to invest in 
land assets or real estate instead. As a result technology tended to stagnate and growth was 
very weak or ephemeral. Hence, the decline of mining can be explained by the prevailing 
macroeconomic situation that made financing scarce, particularly for those long-term 
returns on investment like mining.24 As a consequence, the dire fiscal situation of the new 
republics curtailed urgently needed investment in mining. This in turn deprived the 
                                                           
22 Between 1824 and 1825 26 mining association formed to exploit Spanish American gold and silver mines 
and invested around 1 million sterling. (Rippy 1959, 19) Contemporaries and historians agree more on the 
overoptimistic estimation of costs and surcharges made by contractors, together with the incorrect 
assessment of technological needs. Speculative contractors associated with British investments did not help to 
foster the industry. However the experience of US private capital in Mexican mining shows a different 
trajectory. Between 1819 and 1824 40 million pesos left Peru, “half of them without duty”( Humphreys, 1940, 
p.116-17). British Consuls estimated that a third of total South American legal silver output was 
underrepresented by a third because of contraband. 
23 Omiste (1893).   
24 This was an overall feature of Latin American development in the early national period. A study on an 
allegedly opposite case, the success of pastoral exports while cereal agriculture stagnated in the River Plate 
before 1870s, shows the same. Irigoin, (2000a) 
independent states of a major source of revenue, which further exacerbated the vicious 
cycle of fiscal hardship and economic stagnation. 
Liberating Latin America from Spanish mercantilist restrictions (and from the 
intermediaries and transaction costs associated with them) is usually seen as a cornerstone 
of the revolutionary process. But with freer trade post-colonial governments increasingly 
relied on taxes levied on commerce, which ultimately taxed consumption. External customs 
and levies on internal commerce/sales (the colonial alcabala) became the main source of 
income for many of the new states. The particular dependence of Latin American countries 
on indirect taxes on consumption did not change until well into the twentieth century. 
These taxes were relatively cheap to collect and provided immediate income to cash 
starving treasuries.  
Initially custom duties were lowered in comparison with the rates of former colonial trade 
taxes. Colonial almojarifazgo or custom charged a 3 or 7% duty if the goods were Spanish, 
but an additional general import duty of 33.3% was charged on foreign merchandise. 
Originally, new tariffs averaged 20-25% of import prices across the new republics. As a 
result manufactures flooded into the continent and huge outflows of bullion resulted in a 
massive trade disequilibrium. Within a few years tariffs rose sharply (in nominal terms), 
surpassing colonial rates, in order to meet the needs of budget deficits and detain the drain 
of specie. In most countries particular sectors demanded protection. Thus some goods 
were subject at times to prohibitions or prohibitive duties, like sugar in Peru, some textiles 
in Mexico or hats in Buenos Aires.  
Silver was the main export of the region: 80% of Peru’s and all of Mexico and Bolivia’s 
exports. Despite the fact that Buenos Aires had no metal resources, in the 1830s bullion 
represented a third of its exports. The high dependence on silver for exports led to 
restrictive but ineffectual policies on the extraction of bullion in all the new republics. The 
measures not only affected actual shipments abroad but also domestic transactions within 
the same country. Silver and gold exports were either prohibited as in Bolivia or heavily 
taxed, 6% ad valorem in Chile. In Bolivia and Mexico a further tax was charged on bullion in 
circulation between regional markets. The role of Buenos Aires as intermediary (not a 
producer) in the exports of bullion was apparent in its low export tax of 1% on silver and 
2% on gold. 
After the 1840s, as other commodities for export appeared, bullion became less important 
in Latin America’s exports. (Bairoch, 1985) These were also the beginnings of the export 
booms in some particularly resource-endowed economies, such as the River Plate 
countries, Colombia and Peru, which would thrive by the century’s end. Frequently, the 
fiscal system became a source of subsidies for these sectors, aggravating its re-distributive 
effects. Pastoral exports form the pampas, for instance, bore no taxes except for hides, 
which paid specific duties denominated in the local currency, the inconvertible paper peso. 
Hence as a result of currency depreciation the Treasury gathered lower real revenues (Tanzi 
effects) and the fiscal bill of exporters was nullified. This represented an indirect subsidy 
for exporters at the expense of urban consumers, which substantially bolstered the growth 
of exports in the region. (Irigoin, 2000a) 
In the case of Peru and New Granada lower import duties were initially intended to divert 
the tax burden from the rural indigenous peasantry to urban consumers. (Jacobsen 1989, 
Jaramillo, Meisel & Urrutia 2001) Yet the fundamentals of the tariff scheme did not 
change. Although it was initially simplified the tariff schedule was organised along the 
traditional lines of granting privileges on individual products. The levy was a proportion of 
the price and, short of officials thanks to the collapse of the fiscal administration, the price 
was usually self declared by merchants. This made the valuation of the fiscal base 
troublesome, and gave importers an easy means of reducing their tax bill by under-
assessing the value of goods.25  
External customs thus remained the main source of ordinary income in the region. 
(Centeno,1997) With extreme shares of 90% of total revenues depending on them in 
countries like Argentina or Uruguay, or 1850s Peru, new republics obtained on average two 
thirds or more of their revenues from taxes on trade. This was also the case of Chile, 
Ecuador and Venezuela.26 Customs rendered a third or more of Colombia and Mexico’s 
revenues, which slightly decreased after the 1830s. In only two countries did customs 
contribute little or nothing to the treasury. Paraguay was once such odd case. After the 
revolution it split from neighbouring provinces and became a highly autarkic economy. 
Paraguayan Customs revenues were either negligible or nil in some years. Complete 
isolation from the international economy lasted until the Great War with Brazil, Uruguay 
and Argentina in the 1860s (Pastore, 1993). Yet income from levies on internal commerce 
formed 30% of total income. This was also the case of Bolivia, which collected up to 7% of 
its income from import taxes while it had access to the Pacific. For a decade only, the 
1830s, Bolivia could trade directly overseas, and had the lowest tariff in the region as a way 
of diverting trade from its usual intermediaries with the international economy, Valparaiso 
(Chile), Arica (Peru) or Buenos Aires (Argentina).Yet sale taxes were charged at every 
sizeable village. Thus Customs and alcabala together made up 40% of total treasury income, 
equating the income from the Indian head tax. (Huber, 1990) 
Generally speaking the internal tax on trade, the colonial sales tax or alcabala was the 
second major source of revenues. Rates were a proportion of the price and varied in 
different regions: 4% in Buenos Aires, 6% in both Perus and 8% in Mexico (lowered to 6% 
in 1790). It was subsequently charged on every item sold in the domestic markets. By late 
colonial times its yield represented 14% of total revenues in Peru, 24% in Chile and 6% in 
the Upper Peru.27 Already in 1780 alcabalas rendered to the Mexican Treasury more than 
silver taxes.28 With the 1760s reforms the fiscal base of those paying alcabala was broadened 
to include the indigenous population, which had been originally exempted according to 
privileges granted by the Habsburgs sovereigns. In 1776 it was extended to basic foodstuffs 
of the indigenous population (chuño, charqui, ají, aguardiente, tobacco, sugar y native textiles). 
When in subsequent years the Crown tried to impose alcabala on grain and maize, Indians 
in Upper Peru revolted led by Tupac Amaru and Tupac Catari.29 
Thus, revolutionary government sought to abolish the alcabala, as they did with the head 
tax. However sale taxes were soon restored for the same reason: the urgent need for 
revenue. In the case of Mexico the collection of both was granted to the states by the 
federal constitution of 1824, whereas the Federal government collected Customs revenues. 
In Bolivia it persisted until the beginning of twentieth century. In New Granada alcabala 
still formed 13% of total revenues in the 1830s. (Jaramillo, Meisel & Urrutia, 2001, 428).  In 
the River Plate it was abolished early in the 1820s when foreign trade looked promising, 
but the sales tax was restored by the late 1830s in the northern provinces where commerce 
in transit was more significant. 
                                                           
25 In 1868, after several reforms liberalising the tariff and improving its collection, Argentina, whose fiscal 
institutions were one of the most modern and market friendly at the time, (Amaral 1993) still had 1148 
articles listed in a tariff schedule of over 275 pages in length.   
26 Peru followed after the 1840 reforms. By then income from Guano exports allowed the fiscal bottleneck 
inherited from the fiscal bankruptcy at the end of Spanish rule to be sorted out. (Gootenberg, 1993) 
27 The tariff of this sale tax had been increasing since late colonial times. Originally it was 2%, doubling in 
1772, and increasing again to 6% in 1778. The effective burden has been estimated from 4.5% to 7% in Perú, 
and from 1.7% to 2.4% in Upper Perú in the late eighteenth century. (Newland, mimeo)   
28 Marichal, (1990) p 73. 
29 O’Phelan Godoy, (1986)  
More importantly, whereas duties on exports other than bullion (if any) were specific, both 
taxes on imports and on sales were ad valour levies, charged on the current price of goods. 
The tariff for both taxes was a proportion of the aforo price, allegedly the current price in 
the local market. For European manufactures it was usually appraised at the ports of entry. 
As the fiscal valuation was most often a price self-declared by the importer, the aforos were 
thus established in prices denominated in local currency. In fact the tax was included in the 
final price borne by consumers. Imports boomed with greater openness to trade and the 
new fiscal and political boundaries. As the fiscal burden fell mainly on imported goods, 
regardless of where they were manufactured, and because imports constituted a large 
proportion of consumer goods, the tax eventually burdened consumers. The tariff was 
ultimately a source of revenues, and its effects on commerce were less important than fiscal 
considerations. Even those liberal reformers that were confident that lowering the duty 
would increase the yield (anticipating the effects of the Laffer curve) had to compromise 
with more conservative policy makers in devising a realistic rate to secure the income of 
treasuries. 
Due to fragmented fiscal sovereignty, imported goods continued paying levies as they were 
moved through the continent, despite the freer trade policies at the ports. In fact, the 
relatively lower tariff at the port was one of the instruments used to wage commercial war 
in the contentious strife for revenues among these economies. Thus European goods bore 
double taxation as “foreign” merchandise had to pay Customs at the ports and successively 
paid taxes as they went further inland on carts. This meant a redistribution of income, or at 
least of the fiscal burden across the regions. The persistence of internal customs and levies 
that charged goods on transit (within regions that formerly had been part of the same fiscal 
unit), while tariffs were relatively lower at ports, resulted in distortions to prices that 
benefited the littoral economies at the expense of the most populated economies located in 
the interior. 
 
III. b. MONETARY FRAGMENTATION 
The role of the Spanish American silver peso in the development of the world economy is 
widely known and the literature is as diverse as it is vast in explaining its success. It was 
probably the "single most successful money" and international means of payment before 
the days of the gold standard.30 Spanish possession of American mines and the rents from 
them were the main cause of Spanish splendour and decline between the sixteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries. The Spanish Empire was the largest monetary union ever known. 
Independence resulted in the fragmentation of that monetary union, and this had 
consequences in trade and production over a wide economic region that had formerly been 
highly integrated. Contrary to the traditionally assumption of the empire as merely a system 
to extract fiscal revenues to Europe, the colonial “economic system” organised around 
silver mining was very integrated and nearly autarkic. It linked regional production and 
markets from very distant regions.31  
                                                           
30 A recent argument of "demand side explanation" relies on the force of Chinese demand for silver 
(manifested in the spectacular price premiums of silver) as the force that drove the birth and expansion of 
global trade. Thus Flynn and Giraldez (2002) explain the rise and success of the silver peso. However their 
compelling consideration does not account for its demise. 
31 Studies on the production and marketing of silver in colonial Spanish America have estimated that 40% of 
Potosi output in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remained within the domestic economy. See the 
seminal study by CS Assadourian, (1986). Domestic trade has been neglected in studies of the economic 
history of Latin American countries. 
In Mexico during the Insurgencia (1811-1821) the disruption of the treasury network led 
Spanish officials to authorise the minting of silver coins elsewhere.32 The same had 
happened in the metropolis following the French invasion in 1808, when the crown re-
established the mints in Barcelona and opened others in Mallorca, Cadiz and Valencia. 
(Matamala 2001, fn 13-14) During this turbulent decade both Royalists and Patriots struck 
very low quality silver coins. 33 They were known as the “hammered dollars” by the US 
mint, and were distinguishable from the Spanish pillar dollar because “it was decidedly 
inferior, being worth 101 cents on the average  [compared to 106.3 cents for Mexico latter 
coins] and withal very irregular”.34   The number of provincial mints was increased under 
the Empire (1821-23) and, after 1824, the Republic. The Federal Constitution of 1824 
maintained the prerogative to coin silver in each state that already had a mint house at 
work, providing - ineffectively- that the federal government was responsible for overseeing 
the standards at each establishment.35 Thus the monopoly over the coinage of the former 
Imperial Casa de Moneda in Mexico City ended altogether, along with the monetary system 
that had existed for centuries in the richest part of the Empire. Thus, these states had an 
additional and powerful source to fund their participation in the armed conflict that 
characterised Mexican political development over the century: the dispute between 
centralism and federalism over the republic’s constitution. 
Indeed, the existence of several mints was an impediment to the federal government to 
enjoy seignorage as a source of revenues and made it impossible to execute decisions as a 
monopolistic monetary authority. From 1811 to 1821 the six new Casas minted an extra 
third of the 104 millions pesos produced in Mexico city. (Informe, 1857, Ortiz Peralta 
1998: 134). Between 1822 and 1824 the proportion increased to more than a half of the 
total Mexican silver coins, since minting in the capital plummeted to 8.6 million. In the 
1840s there were ten Casas manufacturing hundreds of millions of silver coins (as well as 
gold for 27 million pesos), which all contributed to expanding the amount of currency in 
circulation.36 In the period 1824-1856, the mint at the capital city coined only 65 million 
                                                           
32 Alleging "difficulties to send silver remittances to Mexico city" six new official mints appeared in 
Chihuahua (1811-14), Durango (1811-21), Guadalajara (1812-21), Guanajuato (1812-21), Zacatecas (1810-21) 
and Sombrerete (1812-12). (Informe, 1857) In addition, Oaxaca and Morelia coined money, if briefly, on their 
own initiative while cut off from communications with Mexico City. (Meek, 1948 p. 50). Local authorities 
declared that silver in circulation was scarce, and that budget shortfalls resulted from military expenses. 
(Matamala 2001, p. 20) 
33 The standard Spanish peso de a 8 reals was .902 fineness and 28.76 grams The provisional royalist peso coined 
in Durango had .895 fineness, 40 mm diameter and weighted 26.84 grams. The one struck at (Real del 
Catorce) was 32.01 grams. At Sombrerete it weighted 26.66 grams and 42 mm diameter. Coins occasionally 
struck in Oaxaca weighted 27.33 grams and 39.5 mm. Those from Chihuahua weighted 26.04 grams. Among 
the patriots monies, coins struck in Michoacan were 27.91 grams and 39.6mm. In Veracruz,  a 2 reals coins 
weighted only 5.69 grams 26.6mm. Pesos from Guerrero, known as Morelos piece, weighed 19.04 grams and 
38.8 mm. The Morelos SUD  constituted a payment promise to be exchanged for its face value as soon as 
possible. It weighted 24.53 grams and 38.5 mm. Insurgents also minted copper in Acapulco and Guerrero. 
Royalists counterstamped small denomination coins of 4 reals and in Veracruz, Zacatecas pesos (28.66 grams 
and 40.6 mm), were stamped again by Spaniards.  The Chihuahua mint had a huge variety of issues. So the 
authorities, the army and merchants were obliged to use counterstamps to secure its circulation. In 1821-23 
Emperor Iturbide coined pesos of  .902 fineness, 26.95 grams   and 40 mm, together with small 
denomination copper coins. www.cmonedam.com.mx/cmm/numismatica/hist.htm  
34 They “may be known by their defaced appearance, which is not due to wear but to blow of the hammer, by 
which they were coined”. United States 39th Congress, 3rd Session, Ex Doc. 71. House of Rep. Letter from 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 11th February 1857. 
35 In 1828 another mint house opened in San Luis Potosi. Chihuahua resumed coinage in 1832. Guadalupe y 
Calvo’s operated after 1843 and Culiacan from 1846, and, a small mint struck pesos briefly in Tlapan, within 
today’s Mexico city as a separate mint between 1828-30.  
36 Between 1824 and 1839 Mexico City coined 24.2 million pesos, Guanajuato 29.5 million and Zacatecas 70.5 
millions pesos. (Informe, 1857) In 1847 the mint at Mexico City was rented out and in the following decades 
silver pesos, less than a sixth of the Mexican currency of the period, while the others 
combined produced a further 365 million.37 This reduction of coinage at the former main 
Imperial mint was partly due to the shortfall of silver coming into the capital city. 
Meanwhile the overall legal output of silver was decreasing. The different capacities of 
producing silver coins in the several mint houses must have affected the stock and 
circulation of money in Mexico. 
Figure 1. Coinage of Silver, Mexico mint houses 1824-1856 
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This compounded with the subsequent disadvantaging of the merchants’ commercial 
interests in the city and in the subsidiary port of Veracruz. Given the location of these new 
mints houses, silver from Chihuahua had easier access to overseas through the port of 
Guaymas. Mexican pesos struck in Durango, Cualiacan, Guadalajara or Zacatecas must 
have enjoyed better purchasing power on imports brought via Mazatlan or Tepic on the 
Pacific than via the former overland route from Veracruz. Similarly, the port of Tampico 
on the Gulf must have favoured silver minted in nearby San Luis Potosi or Guanajuato.  
This relative proximity to alternative ports through which silver could be exchanged in the 
still buoyant trade with China, or into the Atlantic economy, allowed them to avoid the 
former monopolistic intervention of merchants in Mexico City, Veracruz, and Acapulco. 
Taken together with the different capacities (in terms of metal endowment), this must have 
differently affected the purchasing power of silver pesos in relation to imports. Regional 
mercantile elites and networks had to develop accordingly. So contemporary political strife 
between Centralists in Mexico City and Federalists in the states is not surprising.38   
                                                                                                                                                                              
all the other mints were run privately, most of them by US merchants. In 1861 Benito Juarez introduced the 
decimal system for fractional money.  
37 Zacatecas’ mint only coined 144 million pesos in the same period; Guanajuato coined 121 million, and 
Durango, Guadalajara and San Luis Potosi combined struck more pesos than the Mexico City mint. (Informe, 
1857:36). 
38 In addition, Mexico City also minted small denomination copper coins amounting to 5-8 million pesos. 
(Memoria, 1849:36). In the late 1830s manipulation in the coinage of copper provoked social discontent with 
dramatic political consequences. (Torres Medina 1998). In 1880 there were still 11 mint houses in Mexico. 
Between 1893 and 1903 all of them closed but the one in Mexico City following a reform by Minister 
Limantour. Only then did the Federal government recover the monopoly over seigniorage. (Lopez Rosado, 
1975, p.56) 
There was ample room for competition among the Casa de Monedas to attract silver bars to 
mint. Mint houses in the hands of the states rendered income from seigniorage. Chronic 
budget deficits and a shrinking fiscal basis, coupled with the exhaustion of domestic 
borrowing had to increase the attractiveness of mint houses as a source of revenue. After 
all debasement and monetary manipulations had colonial antecedents.39 All of this ought to 
have been reflected in different relative prices or profits for miners and in the quality of 
pesos coined, namely in the exchange rates of Mexican pesos within the country.40 
However barely any research has been done on Mexico’s provincial mint houses. This 
should be considered in addition to transport costs and war damages in assessing the 
economic capacity of silver mining and the performance of the aggregate economy in 
nineteenth century Mexico.  
Thus, one of the most valuable features of the Spanish American peso was broken, the 
standard of quality. Historians have paid little attention to the differences in appearance, 
fineness or weight of the Mexican silver coins in the post-independence period. However, 
scattered evidence suggests they were wide. Crown officials had already been reluctant to 
open new mints, and regretted the creation of the provincial mint houses as “dangerous to 
the governance of the kingdom” (Matamala 2001, 22).41  
According to historians the post-independence, Mexican peso initially lost its acceptance 
“because the world was not used to the new design introduced after 1824” that substituted 
the bust of Spanish sovereigns for the eagle. In the Philippines, as the “[ruling class] were 
all royalists …, they could not tolerate the circulation of coins proceeding from the 
provinces in revolt … this it would be a tacit approval of the insurrection in [the 
Philippines] whereas the sovereign had spared no sacrifice and no effort in the pacification 
of these republican countries which were now in upheaval and anarchy and unable to 
guarantee the purity of the metal which they coined” (Perez Gilbert, 1955. 52)  In 
China the Mexican peso was received at 15%  below the usual parity for the old Spanish 
pesos.42 The repeated mentions of the scarcity of circulating medium and the use of foreign 
coins in acceptance for taxes is indicative of Gresham law effects in the currency system.43 
China had been the main customer for Spanish and Mexican pesos since the sixteenth 
century. Whereas the pesos bearing the bust of Carlos IV enjoyed a 30% premium on the 
intrinsic value there, the Chinese soon distinguished the differences between old and new 
silver coins minted in Spanish America. Pesos struck in Chile, Bolivia or Peru, for reasons 
explained below, suffered discounts in Asian markets, whereas Mexican coins traded at 
premium. Even pesos minted in Mexico were not equally regarded, depending on the letter 
that indicated the original mint house. Apparently coins struck in Guadalajara were 
                                                           
39 In 1728-1730 the peso piece had been reduced in weight and fineness to 417.6 grains at .9166 fineness (11 
dineros): the pillar peso. In 1772 Carlos III lowered the fineness again to .90278 (10 dineros 20 grains) but the 
weight remained the same: the bust peso 
40 A personal communication from Dr. A. Ibarra (UNAM) about miners in Guadalupe & Calvo avoiding the 
minting of silver bars, despite having paid all taxes and mint charges, is very indicative. According to his 
sources, miners had a great incentive to smuggle their silver. Profits from keeping silver in lumps or in bars 
had to be greater than the costs from seigniorage. In the utility function of miners, the risk of adulteration of 
silver once coined could well explain this otherwise irrational behaviour.  
41 With the backing of the Consulados merchants formed guilds from Mexico and Veracruz. They tried to close 
provisional mints in 1816, but the reaction of miners and merchants in the provinces impeded it. Losses from 
missing seigniorage were estimated at 5% of the Mexico mint’s profits.  
42 (Perez Rosado, 1975 p. 47) recalls a following appreciation to recover the premium that the Spanish 
American coins had traditionally enjoyed in the Far East. No dates are provided.  
43 Thus, the success of the 1903 monetary reform in Mexico, which allowed the country to adhere to the 
Gold Standard, is explained by “the success of the (federal) government at surveying the characteristics of 
coins, which was impossible before given the number of mint houses at work” (Lopez Rosado, 1975, p 49-
50, 58) 
notoriously less favoured among the Mexican pesos.44 Coins from these provincial mints 
circulated widely in China “with different degree of acceptation”. (McMaster, 1955, p. 388) 
It is plausible then to think that they also circulated at different exchange rates within 
Mexico.  Similar observations on standards were made at the other end of the trade with 
silver pesos. American merchants were becoming the main intermediaries of trade with 
China and in the export of Mexican silver pesos. The US mint observed in 1835 that “the 
tendency of Mexican dollars of more recent issues deviate from their proper standard, 
which has been noticed in the reports on foreign coins within the last two years. It appears 
equally conspicuous in some of the latest dates. This however, seems to be almost 
exclusively confined to the issues of the provincial mints, and is not in any material degree 
observable in the coinage excepted at the city of Mexico”.45 
The literature acknowledges the monetary chaos in post independence New Granada 
(Meisel, 2001). Already in colonial times, the gold coins minted in both Bogota and 
Popayan did not keep up with the Spanish colonial standard. Because of the situados, 
various silver pieces coined at different mints also circulated in the region. With the 
Revolution, Patriots in control of Cartagena in 1811 debased silver coins and minted 
copper until 1815. Royalists in Popayan minted silver pieces of any quality or weight. In 
Bogota silver pesos of different quality were minted (the so called chinas) between 1814 and 
1816. The constitutional assembly of 1821 sought to restore stability and directed the 
coinage of silver and gold with the usual colonial standards.46 However until 1828 the 
government secretly minted much lower quality pieces stamped with the year of the 
constitution 1821 as a (false) guarantee of silver content. These coins had a fineness of .666 
and .538 of pure silver (or 8 dineros and 7 dineros 12 grains). In the early 1830s reports 
from the Assayer at the US mint found that gold coins from Colombia “among themselves, 
present varieties meriting notice”. Whereas silver pesos struck in Colombian mints varied 
from the intrinsic value of 75 cents to newer pieces worth about 93 or 95 cents. 47 
According to a contemporary, insolvent governments of the time lacked the means to run 
the mint and procure a sound standard for the Colombian pesos. (Restrepo, 1860 p.14) 
Hence several attempt in the late 1820s and 1830s to redeem the bad silver in circulation 
and reform the currency were never accomplished. Furthermore new coins were in greater 
demand in Ecuador and Venezuela so it was hard to withdraw the poorer quality coins 
from circulation in Bogota.48 Apparently Gresham law effects, which were imported from 
                                                           
44 They were called peso del anzuelo (angle peso) in reference to the letter G stamped in the coins for 
Guadalajara mint.  
45 United States, 23rd Congress 2nd Session. Doc.60 House of Rep. Assay of foreign coins, "Letter from the 
Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a reports of the Director of the Mint". 6th January 1835.  
46 Fiat money was tried in 1821 and again in 1838 in the form of treasury bills.  The following pages drew 
information from  http://www.banrep.gov.co/blaavirtual/hbinx.htm  
47 "Those from Bogota were found to be 21 carats fine, corresponding to 84.84 cents per pennyweight while 
those of Popayan were of 20 carats 2 grains fine, corresponding to 83.58 cents per pennyweight. United 
States 22nd Congress. 1st Session. Doc 115. House of Rep. 15th February 1833.   
48 In what is present day Ecuador, gold in powder or silver bars smelted in Riobamba circulated domestically 
better than coined gold during colonial rule. After Independence Colombian and Peruvian coins circulated 
widely. Because of different intrinsic values they disappeared out of circulation, and in 1830 the government 
started printing money. Paper notes were accepted at par for 50% of import duties. In 1832 a Mint House 
started coining gold and silver while establishing exchange rates with foreign currencies. The Ecuadorian 
silver peso had .875 grains fineness and 30.64 grams of weight. However after 1838 worse quality coins from 
Colombia and Bolivia began pouring into the country, and the official standard could not be maintained. 
Huge forgery occurred and in 1845-47 the first monetary crisis ever recorded occurred in Ecuador. Between 
1859 and 1862 the government authorised the establishment of private banks of issue that printed 
inconvertible paper pesos. The over issue of notes and the speculative expansion of credit followed. In the 
short run the paper currency experienced inflation and depreciation. The gold premium reached 60% by 
1874, the time of the "second" monetary crisis. (Carbo, 1978) 
coexisting silver in circulation in the Caribbean, also made the policy more difficult.49 Every 
reform to unify the circulating medium included a fixed exchange rate at which the old 
coins would be changed or received by the Treasury. As the export of bullion remained 
prohibited, incorrect valuations of actual market prices ultimately accelerated the 
substitution of currencies. 
With debasement and currencies of different quality in circulation, gold and good silver 
were heavily hoarded. Hence specie in circulation (on the surface) appeared to be short. 
Rightly, the Colombian economic historian Alfredo Meisel argues that the problem was not 
currency scarcity but the poor quality of coins. The alleged shortage of circulating medium 
was notorious in the 1840s. Reforms in 1846-48 were more effective at stabilising the 
currency in Colombia. The colonial fractionally units for currency were decimalized, silver 
was coined with .900 fineness and, more importantly, the export of bullion or uncoined 
gold was then permitted with a 6% duty. In the following years coinage was reduced 
dramatically. However according to historians, after 1850 Colombian prices steadily 
increased over the next 30 years. (Meisel, www) Apparently Colombian exports boomed 
(Ocampo 1984) and the pressure to coin local bullion was reduced. The improvement in 
the balance of payments avoided deflation, and even domestic prices rose. Yet the causality 
of the relation between a more stable currency and the economic recovery deserves further 
research.  
Republican governments in colonies further south also retained the monopoly over the 
minting of silver coins. They maintained their authority over monetary policy and could 
therefore collect revenues from seigniorage. However, there were significant changes 
regarding the colonial monetary system that had been in place previously. In Peru the 
export of silver bars was prohibited, and when coined shipments of silver were subject to a 
5% tax. As the government was financially broke, it was unable to make advances upon the 
metals for coinage so it could not effectively run the mint house. Already by 1826 the mint 
was operated semi-privately by British merchants, who procured the capital to purchase 
silver and produced pesos, and the seigniorage was estimated at 14% of the silver value. 
(Humphreys, 1940, p150). According to British consuls there were great advantages in illicit 
exports of silver piña or uncoined silver, so contraband trade was huge.50 Yet the same 
observer noted that there was no smuggling of silver in lumps from Chile after the 
government allowed its export with a 7% duty. Chile had a more relaxed fiscal policy about 
the extraction of metals, but bullion bore a heavier seigniorage tax (18%) (Humphreys, 
1940 p. 95) As the financial position of Chilean governments was more comfortable they 
also had a more sound currency policy.  
Potosi had been the original source of silver in the spectacular rise of the Spanish peso in 
the sixteenth century. During the convulsive years of 1810-1825, the Spanish and several 
insurgent armies battled for control of the region despite the fact that mining output had 
long been in decline.51 Once the republic of Bolivia was established the colonial mint house 
at Potosi remained in the hands of the republican government. In the aftermath of 
Independence, Bolivia was coining around 1,8 to 2,4 millions pesos per annum. The dearth 
of small change moved it  to decree the minting of small denomination coins (of half and a 
                                                           
49 Safford (1965, 115) quoted in Jaramillo, Meisel & Urrutia (2001, fn 55) 
50 Comparing the relative value of silver lumps and coined as a remittance to England in 1826, which included 
costs of fright, insurance, duties and other charges, the difference was about 9 % in favour of plata piña. This 
included an extra charge of 7% upon the price of silver in lumps from "expenses of smuggling " Ricketts to 
Canning, 27 December 1826 cited by Humphreys, (1940 p.151) 
51 The River Plate Confederation led by Buenos Aires tried repeatedly to control today Bolivia. Whereas 
indigenous resistance persisted in the countryside, the Spaniards harshly controlled the big towns. The mint 
was ransacked every time it changed hands until 1825, when the Revolutionary armies triumphed.  
quarter real) with a lower content of silver than the usual .902 fineness.52 In 1829, pure 
silver was reduced to .666 in the smaller denomination coins. The peso piece continued to 
be minted under the usual fineness and content. Other apparent features remained 
identical. Adulteration meant a 26.14% reduction in the metallic base of the smaller coins 
in relation to the peso. This began to be distinguished as the peso fuerte (hard peso), and the 
adulterated coins as feeble pesos. Repeated adulteration of the silver content permitted an 
increase in the quantity of money in circulation in nominal terms. Thereafter the coinage of 
adulterated pieces resulted in an artificial expansion of currency, namely a debasement of 
the Bolivian silver currency.  
Debasement as a monetary policy of the Bolivian government began in 1830 and was 
initially low. It represented about 5% of the total coinage of the decade. The proportion of 
bad coins increased four-fold in the 1840s, and during the 1850s they formed the 40% of 
the stock of money coined in Bolivia. In the 1860s all the Bolivian pesos were feeble or 
debased.53 As an attempt to change this monetary policy, Bolivia (as well as Peru) 
introduced a decimal system for the fraction of the peso in 1863. However, this extravagant 
debasement lasted until the early 1870s. In 1872, exports of silver were freed and so was 
minting thereafter. This reform ended the government monopoly of coinage but created a 
paper currency, and an incipient government owned establishment initiated Bolivia’s 
banking system. (Peñaloza Cordero, 1944) One of the first operations was a redemption of 
all the feeble coins with bank notes at a fixed exchange rate. At that time the international 
economy was decisively moving towards the rule of gold standard. The decreasing 
international price of silver finally pushed Bolivia to move to a fiduciary money standard. 
Ironically the legal production of silver also recovered to the levels not achieved since 
shortly before the revolution.54 
Figure 2. Debasement of Bolivian silver peso, 1826-1872 
                                                           
52 According to the decree, coins in circulation had disappeared because of "the extraction of silver" decree of 
10th October 1829 reproduced in Prados (1995, apx 2). The colonial standard n Potosi was 10 dineros 20 
grains of fineness (.902) and 542 grains of weight.  
53 The reform tried to change the existing bi-monetary system resuming the coinage of .902 fineness silver 
coins, the peso boliviano. However these pieces weighed 400 grains, which made them equivalent to the feeble 
pesos. In 1865 a further debasement was made to small denomination coins, the notorious Melgarejos, that 
were worth only 6 dineros, or .500 fineness of pure silver. 
54 Over the century legal production had fallen from around 1400 tonnes in late colonial times to about 840 
tonnes in the 1800s. Further contraction ensued, and from 1830 to 1860 average production of legal silver per 
decade was 500 tonnes according to official figures. Mitre (1986, Table II)  
In the River Plate Buenos Aires inaugurated the use of paper money very early soon after 
the revolution. By 1817 a quasi bank Caja de Depositos started issuing paper scrip as a 
government liability, which was received at customs. The mass of paper created by this 
institution, plus several other instruments like treasury bills, originated in the expenses of 
the revolutionary armies. It resulted in a serious monetary disorder. As these papers 
circulated in a secondary market, private money also appeared. These were antecedents to 
the creation of the Banco de Descuentos in 1822. Originally it sought to restore monetary 
order and provide liquidity, although this bank (the single financial institution in the region 
until the 1870s) transformed soon into a government bank of issue. After 1826 the printing 
of inconvertible paper notes by the bank became one of the foundations of Buenos Aires’ 
economic and political leadership over neighbouring provinces.  
The other provinces that were confederated in the former colonial River Plate, known as 
the Provincias Unidas, also created their own money. Those with adequate mineral resources 
occasionally mint silver coins of an average .750 fineness.55 Others, further away from 
Bolivian mines and better integrated to export their pastoral produce through the Atlantic, 
tried a fiduciary currency to cope with the shortage of specie. All of them eventually failed. 
This was the case of money printed in 1840 in Tucuman, when the ruling Northern League 
tried to furnish resources to fight Buenos Aires. Notwithstanding that the League had 
(hopelessly) imposed capital punishment on those who refused to accept the notes.56 
Ultimately the ‘flight’ of bullion to Buenos Aires in silver or gold ounces, which were the 
reserves of these paper monies, explains the differential successes of fiduciary experiments 
in the River Plate. 57 As a result all sort of monies circulated in the Interior of the River 
Plate. By the 1840s Bolivian silver coins were so abundant that they acquired the status of 
                                                           
55 Between 1831 and 1857 La Rioja minted about half million pesos of intermediate quality. Salta and 
Cordoba also coined silver. Although significant in terms of their regional GDP, on the whole the sums were 
minor. J Alvarez, (1929, 99), Omiste(1893, 19).   
56 Halperín Donghi, (1979,  91).   
57 That was the fate of other ephemeral banking experiences as the Confederation and the Brazilian Maua 
banks.   
Debasement of Bolivian silver peso, 1825-1872
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
18
25
18
27
18
29
18
31
18
33
18
35
18
37
18
39
18
41
18
43
18
45
18
47
18
49
18
51
18
53
18
55
18
57
18
59
18
61
18
63
18
65
18
67
18
69
18
71
si
lv
er
 m
ar
ks
 s
m
el
te
d 
(0
00
)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
de
ba
se
m
en
t (
%
)
legal tender in the Interior provinces of present day Argentina, where they had a different 
rate of exchange. Indeed monetary diversity lasted until 1881 when the ‘gold peso’ was 
adopted as a national monetary unit.58  
Unlike other contemporary experiments to fund major political transitions with fiat money, 
like the Confederation’ continental in North America or the French revolution, the paper 
peso of Buenos Aires enjoyed a long if turbulent life of 40 years, until 1867. Then the peso 
recovered convertibility with silver at a rate 25 times lower than originally, with the 
extraordinary circumstance of lacking the metallic reserves to back the change of monetary 
regime. Buenos Aires’ inconvertible paper peso remained in circulation, despite repeated 
massive issues, because of the fiscal fragmentation that followed the revolution in the River 
Plate. Receiving paper notes in return for taxes was the mechanism conceived by the 
Buenos Aires’ government to enforce acceptance of the peso as legal tender. Buenos Aires 
controlled the customs house at the single port in the region that had access to overseas trade. 
The bulk of her income came from duties on imports largely consumed far beyond the 
province. Duties were paid in paper pesos, the Buenos Aires currency. Thus this artificial 
demand for paper notes helped them remain in circulation. As a result Buenos Aires pesos 
performed far better than other provincial currencies in replacing scarce bullion. 
From 1826 the expansion of currency became the ultimate means to meet fiscal deficits in 
Buenos Aires. With recurrent issues of paper the effects of inflationary tax (the erosion on 
the future value of government obligations due to inflation or depreciation of the means of 
payment) were reduced over time. This obliged the government to issue even more money. 
There were times when the expansion of currency was substantial, so high depreciation 
followed. Subsequently inflationary expectations raised the price of hard currency even 
further and a process of currency substitution began. Gold ounces, silver pesos fuertes or 
feeble pesos and other metallic currencies were preferred to worthless paper scrip. 
Inflationary episodes were followed by marked appreciation of the paper peso and 
deflation. Ultimately high volatility in the exchange rate was a fundamental part of Buenos 
Aires monetary policy.  
High inflation episodes began in 1826-1830, following the decree of inconvertibility. A 
blockade to the port during the war with Brazil strangled imports to Buenos Aires and with 
it, the source of ordinary income, Customs. With inelastic military expenditures, the issue 
of bonds and of inconvertible paper money ensued to solve the fiscal deficit.59 In the 
1830s, the financial position of the government improved, credit recovered and the peso 
appreciated as the economy grew (though mildly) on real terms. After 1837 contentious 
regional relations with the Bolivian and Peruvian confederations over the collection of 
Customs revenues, led to an increase in military spending that wasted the weak fiscal 
recovery. A French blockade to the port during 1838-1841, the extreme dependence of 
Buenos Aires revenues on import taxes and the further contraction of domestic sources of 
borrowing (partly due to inflationary policy), obliged the government to resort to printing 
                                                           
58 Chilean gold circulated also in Mendoza, as Brazilian reals did in Corrientes and Entre Rios. Alvarez,  (1929, 
97, 100-1).  
59 As part of the 1820s fiscal and financial reforms, the floating debt from revolutionary wars was 
consolidated in a funded debt. Original stock amounted  to 5 million pesos. By 1837 further issues increased 
it to 34 million pesos in nominal values. In 1840 another attempt to float bonds for further 10 millions had to 
be sold to the bank, which printed paper pesos to purchase them, as a mean to obtain the offered 60% 
(nominal) price. This was the last recourse to domestic borrowing until the mid 1850s. By then Buenos Aires 
was renegotiating with Baring Bros on the defaulted 1824 loan and a major fiscal reform was under way. 
(Irigoin, 2000b) 
paper pesos for funds. Depreciation peaked and prices of consumer goods skyrocketed.60 
Recovery did not last long as an Anglo French fleet laid siege to the port again in 1845-
1848, which provoked another massive expansion of the currency. The sudden 
appreciation of the exchange rate thereafter provoked a severe deflation with serious 
prejudices to trade and led and a chain of bankruptcies.61 During the 1850s, in the final 
stages of the civil war before the definitive constitution of present day Argentina, the 
monetary means to wage war and fund the deficit continued. However the effects on 
currency depreciation and volatility clearly differed as displayed in the graph.  
Figure 3. Depreciation of Buenos Aires´ paper peso, 1826-1864 
                                                           
60 My own estimates of the composition of Buenos Aires’ imports indicate that about 90% of them were 
foodstuffs and wage goods. Similarly one third of the European goods imported into its port went further 
inland.   
61 This inflationary policy was characteristic of the Rosas regime. Although previous and successive 
administrations followed the same policy in order to fund the state’s chronic insolvency. (Bordo & Vegh, 
1998) 
   
IV. EFFECTS FROM FISCAL AND MONETARY FRAGMENTATION 
With the inheritance of fiscal and financial exhaustion from colonial times, republican 
governments faced difficult alternatives to meet the fiscal disequilibria of post-
independence. Deficits continually recurred in Latin American finances thereafter. Sources 
of domestic borrowing were depleted and tax reforms were highly constrained by the harsh 
exaction imposed by Bourbon rule.  
Where governments could enjoy the monopoly over seignoriage, the expansion of currency 
(either by coinage or by printing paper money) was the last source of revenue to which all 
these political entities resorted.  Elsewhere, as in the case of Mexico, the building of a 
mounting debt protracted repeated debt and political crises. Peru endured 20-years of 
serious recession compounded with deflation. Financially weakened administrations could 
not exercise their rule without disputes. Weak institutionality ensued and the constitution, 
fiscal and political, of these republics was delayed by long civil warfare. Peace and stability 
were achieved only when the competition for revenues and seignoriage ended. Then stable 
institutions and rules of the game took shape, and foreign capital returned to assist in the 
building of markets and polities. Some countries fared better than others in the 
redistribution of income within the fragmented empire together with the inflow of fresh 
money. Those with appropriate resource endowments occasionally or more lastingly 
benefited from ongoing globalisation. In the long run none of them achieved true, 
intensive and sustainable, economic growth.  
Early recourse to funded debt was meant to bring more flexibility for financial manoeuvre 
by postponing short term obligations. Floating debt was consolidated in the aftermath of 
the revolution. Governments at both extremes of the former Empire, like Mexico and 
Buenos Aires, and at each polity in between issued long term bonds while trying new fiscal 
recipes. Yet because of the aforementioned exhaustion of lenders, or due to the effects of 
rapid inflation, public bonds never developed as a sound source of finance, and domestic 
capital markets never took shape.  Budget deficits provoked an early recourse to local 
merchants for funds. These private sources lent or sold goods to the government and 
received promissory bills, treasury notes, and interest bearing vales to be redeemed at 
Customs. In fact, the repetition of this practice resulted on a mortgage on future income, 
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and governments either needed more money or received less revenues every time. So the 
volume of paper scrip increased as the financial mess worsened.  
Figure 4 Debt Burden, Mexico 1822-1855 
 
Lacking monopolistic control over coinage, Federal administrations in Mexico used 
borrowing to stay afloat. The intertemporal budget constraint arising from further 
borrowing at more expensive rates, while committing future revenues to service the debt, 
ended in astronomical rates of debt burden.62 Insolvent governments were unlikely to 
establish or enforce any long-term rule and order. 
Elsewhere, without riches comparable to Mexican silver but with a monopoly over 
seignoriage, the other available resort was the inflationary tax. Initially adulterated coins or 
paper money circulated for their nominal value or did not produce serious inflationary 
effects. In most places debasement concurred with a minor expansion in the demand for 
money due to the revolutionary wars mobilisation. Yet without an equivalent increase in 
the productivity of the economy, the repeated expansion of currency would sooner or later 
manifest itself in inflation. In the 1830s the coinage of feeble pesos did not seem to have 
such an impact in Bolivia. Apparently inflation was already noticeable in the 1840s, and in 
the 1850s debasement was unavoidable. Otherwise, Bolivia could not maintain its imports 
nor fund its already shaky treasury.  
Yet Bolivia could not afford an autonomous monetary policy. Dependence on other 
countries for trade and the retinue of ad valorem taxes “imported” foreign inflation or 
amplified the residual effects on the price of imports caused by monetary manipulations 
elsewhere. Despite debasing its currency, because of existing mercantile networks and 
geographical constraints, Bolivia was obliged to trade with neighbours whose currencies 
were even worse. Figure 5 shows the effects of Buenos Aires’ poor monetary policy, with 
which they could only fund their deficits, on Bolivian currency. Decisions on monetary 
                                                           
62 Nineteenth century European experts considered a 35%  interest service to revenues ratio with the 
"greatest prudence" .. above 45% "the situation looked bleak", and when reaching 55 to 60% "the slightest 
problem shall induce to restructuring". Taken from Flandreau (2003).  If these were the benchmarks for 
international capital markets, or letting the capital flow, how did Mexico’s 120% ratio look to potential 
lenders?  
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affairs taken in Buenos Aires reverberated in Bolivia. Waves of paper notes into the 
Buenos Aires market shook the purchasing power of Bolivian silver pesos, and sudden 
appreciation or depreciation of the silver exchange rate became exogenous shocks. With 
the depreciation of the Buenos Aires peso exchange rate, Bolivian imports cheapened. 
When the opposite occurred, Bolivia had to debase further to maintain the level of imports. 
A highly volatile paper peso on the Atlantic ultimately drove monetary policy in the 
highlands of Potosi.  
 
Figure 5  Autonomous Monetary Policy? Bolivian peso debasement and exchange 
rate in Buenos Aires, 1826-1860.  
 
 
Traditionally economic historians have stressed the role of relatively greater openness to 
trade in explaining the economic success of some Latin American republics after 1870s. 
Very recently some North American scholars have revised the underlying forces of 
commercial policies in Latin America before the Great Depression. They were surprised by 
the degree of protectionism (high tariffs) that prevailed early in the region. (Coatsworth & 
Williamson 2002). This allegedly restrained Latin America from exploiting the forces, and 
enjoying the benefits, of globalisation. In comparison with other economies outside the 
north Atlantic, the nominal degree of protectionism in post-independent Latin America 
was very high, and much higher than elsewhere during the first age of globalisation. As has 
been widely referred to in the literature, the authors also observe that early republican 
governments had strong fiscal objectives driving the tariff policy. So tariff was a "revenue 
source and a protective device for special interests", which precluded the gains from trade 
and further integration into the global economy. However, if custom duties were paid with 
depreciated paper money or bonds that circulated at huge discounts in secondary markets, 
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the effects from financial and monetary policies on the tariff and Customs yields should be 
included to assess more accurately the degree of protectionism in those economies. 
Domestically, they resulted in distortions of relative prices and provoked major income and 
tax burden redistribution. Thus they resulted in distinguishable protection or subsidies to 
some sectors, particularly exporters of non-metallic commodities at the expense of 
consumers. As in other current revisions of globalisation, the current macroeconomic 
situation (and hence the "good domestic policies" or lack of thereof) underlies the benefits 
these countries could have received from the expansion of international trade and financial 
markets characterised by globalisation in this period.63 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The collapse of the Imperial rule did not result in the complete disappearance of the 
colonial fiscal system. Neither did they result in changes in the system of taxation nor in 
the matrix of revenue collection. With the disappearance of the imperial network and the 
ensuing political fragmentation, receipts fell into the hands of new local authorities. In fact 
the observed political fragmentation that resulted from Independence was a mirror-image 
of the structure of the imperial fiscal machinery. On the basis of controlling the regional 
treasury, and by grabbing the old colonial revenues, the regional elites could defend their 
economic interests and be part of the dispute over the design of the new revenue collection 
unit, the republican state. Political fragmentation, as the financial means to fund civil 
warfare, originated in the existing fiscal system. 
The fiscal and monetary fragmentation of the former colonies led to strife over fiscal 
resources. Deficits recurred, and given the impossibility of tax smoothing policy, deficit 
financing by inflationary means further aggravated the fiscal position of the competing 
states. Significant consequences for the economy’s performance resulted from complete 
and repeated fiscal inefficiency, an insufficient fiscal base, and the overwhelming allocation 
of the tax burden on consumers. The results were huge market disintegration, higher and 
massive transaction costs, crowding out, and ultimately more inflation and severe 
distortions in prices and exchange rates.  
The outcome of the studied macroeconomic aspects shows that any comparison between 
the institutional nature of North and South American growth paths is ill conceived. The 
political units on which economic performance is measured were not obvious before the 
1860s. The macroeconomic consequences of independence affected the growth prospects 
of the postcolonial economies in the former Spanish empire. Repeated levies on trade 
provoked by fiscal fragmentation fostered market disintegration and placed further 
obstacles to exchange in addition to transport costs. The diversity of currencies, resulting 
from the coexistence of several monetary authorities (mints and banks of issue, plus private 
monies) caused greater instability.  
Distortions to prices resulted from the structure of taxes (e.g. the pricing of the fiscal base 
on the valuation of an ad valorem tariff for imported consumer goods and specific duties for 
exports). Several unstable metallic currencies and depreciated paper monies amplified the 
Gresham law effects on exchange rates in distant territories given the structure for 
marketing foreign trade, monopolies on Customs on overseas trade, and a web of internal 
customs. Indirect distortions of relative prices and domestic terms of trade (besides those 
from international trade and particular market conditions) provoked shocks in the 
allocation of resources and capital. Currency instability and taxes on the introduction and 
transit of goods produced major alterations in income distribution between different 
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regions and within sectors of a given economy. The production of commodities for export, 
other than silver, benefited indirectly. Whereas consumers were heavily burdened and 
domestic savings were exhausted by the voracity, and insolvency, of the treasuries. Volatile 
currencies and multiple exchange rates promoted hoarding of relatively hard(er) currencies, 
placing further pressure on exchange rates. The alleged shortage of capital that the existing 
historiography identifies was in fact the disappearance (reduction) of loanable capital from 
the surface. High interest rates in domestic markets reflected the high risk premium more 
than scarcity of capital. 
Monetary more than political uncertainty prevailed. This impeded the establishment of 
financial institutions and weakened the scope for capital markets. Capital was available 
through informal and more expensive sources. Higher transaction costs checked 
investments and reduced growth. Inflation became endemic, and remained as the means to 
fund fiscal deficits, and growth was extensive because technology stagnated. The lack of 
improvements in infrastructure kept transport costs for the domestic economies extremely 
high. The lack of investment in technology and domestic transport made it impossible for 
the Latin American economies to benefit from falling costs of long-distance maritime 
freight. Coastal areas profited at the expense of the interior (inland) economies. Different 
regions performed distinctively: Economic growth measured at the federal or national level 
may have stagnated but certain regions within a country outperformed others. Regional 
diversity broadened and concentration without specialisation occurred in some sectors as a 
result of fiscal rents. Disparities, regional and within countries, broadened and inequality 
worsened after independence, affecting the prospect for sustainable growth over time. 
Assessing the institutional and economic performance of the region through the 
perspective of the institutional building process that characterised modern European states 
and the subsequent results in fostering growth is insufficient. One of the most 
comprehensive analyses of the relations between institutions and growth, to which the US 
experience is comparable, is Eric Jones’ explanation for the sustained intensive growth of 
modern Europe (Jones 1981:110). Jones emphasises the double benefits from competitive 
decision making and economies of scale in the occurrence of the “European miracle”. This 
was the double benefit of “the unity within the diversity, that gave Europe the best of both 
worlds”. In the case of postcolonial Latin America the opposite occurred. These economies 
had to face competition from within the unity, a unity that no longer existed. Eventually 
this produced greater diseconomies of scale. The fiscal costs of political and monetary 
fragmentation are a good example. 
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